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1. Introduction: The Rationality of Scientific Change 
and the "Elderly Holdout" 
Many parents feel that there is no longer enough emphasis at elementary 
school on the "three rs". No one could complain that recent philosophy of science 
has failed to emphasise its ''three rs": revolutions, rationality, and realism. In this 
paper I risk being a pain in the rs by returning to the well-worn topic of the ration-
ality of revolutionary scientific change (a topic that in turn raises the problem of 
scientific realism). I concentrate on what appears to be a particularly sharp chal-
lenge to the claim that the development of science has been a rational affair, and 
try to use that challenge to clarify some aspects of the claim. 
The (well-known) challenge stems from Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions and concerns fundamental theory change. Kuhn's view, remember, 
was that an individual scientist's switch to a new paradigm is a "conversion 
experience" that "cannot be forced": reason - in the form of the "objective factors" 
of traditional philosophy of science (empirical accuracy, simplicity, and the 
like)-certainly plays a role but it never dictates the switch to the new paradigm. 1 
Consequently, on Kuhn's view, it is never actually irrational to resist the 
switch. This is true even of those "elderly holdouts" who continue to resist after 
pretty well all their colleagues have switched allegiance. There is, claims Kuhn, 
no "point at which resistance becomes illogical or unscientific." An elderly hold-
out, like Priestley "holding out" against Lavoisier's oxygen theory, may infuriate 
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his colleagues by his stubbornness, but they have no right to brand him irrational 
or unscientific: 
Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have 
committed them to an older tradition . . . is not a violation of scientific stan-
dards. (1962, 151) 
But if Priestley did not violate scientific standards in resisting the oxygen the-
ory of combustion, are we not forced to say that modern day creationists, for ex-
ample, equally do not "violate scientific standards" in resisting Darwinism? In-
deed, if reason never dictates a preference for a new theory (even once the 
revolutionary dust has largely settled) are there any scientific standards to vio-
late? Worries like these have frequently been expressed by Kuhn's critics. And 
Kuhn himself has almost equally frequently, but generally unsuccessfully, at-
tempted to lay such worries to rest-claiming that, when properly understood, 
his views on this particular matter are rather less challenging to philosophical or-
thodoxy than might meet the eye. 
The present paper attempts to clarify this confused situation via a case study 
of one elderly holdout. The historical details will, I hope, supply both a test of 
Kuhn's views and the means of clarifying at any rate some aspects of the general 
claim that the development of science has been a predominantly rational affair. 
2. Sir David Brewster and the Wave Theory of Light 
Obviously a case study of a holdout requires a scientist to do the resisting and 
a scientific revolution to resist. The scientific revolution I have chosen is the early 
nineteenth-century revolution in optics, which saw the wave theory of light 
emerge triumphant over its previously entrenched Newtonian emissionist rival. 
Among the handful of significant holdouts against this revolution two stand out: 
Jean-Baptiste Biot ~nd David Brewster. For various reasons (not least because he 
published the more explicit accounts of his reasons for holdingout) I have chosen 
Brewster. 
First, his credentials. Brewster was certainly no peripheral or negligible 
figure. He was the discoverer of a great many of the properties of polarized light, 
especially elliptically polarized light; he discovered "Brewster's law," relating the 
polarizing angle and refractive index of transparent substances; he discovered a 
whole new class of doubly refracting crystals, the "biaxal crystals"; he discovered 
that ordinary unirefringent matter can be made birefringent by the application of 
mechanical pressure; and he discovered the hitherto unknown general phenome-
non of selective absorption. 
So Brewster was a significant scientist, and he was certainly some sort of hold-
out. In 1831 another knight of the realm, Sir George Biddel Airy, published a 
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Mathematical Tract on the Undulatory Theory of Light, which began with the 
words: 
The Undulatory Theory of Optics is presented to the reader as having the same 
claims to his attention as the Theory of Gravitation; namely that it is certainly 
true. . . . (Airy 1831, vii) 
In that same year, Brewster presented a "Report on the Present State of Physical 
Optics" to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in which he 
asserted that the undulatory theory is "still burthened with difficulties, and cannot 
claim our implicit assent," (Brewster 1833a, 318). Two years later he reported: 
I have not yet ventured to kneel at the new shrine [that is, the shrine of the 
wave theory] and I must acknowledge myself subject to the national weakness 
which urges me to venerate, and even to support, the falling temple in which 
Newton once worshipped. (1833b, 361) 
Although Brewster's "official" published position was usually one of (alleged) the-
oretical neutrality, there can be no doubt that he retained to the end of his life a 
soft spot for the Newtonian theory; that is, for the ancien regime in this revo-
lution. 2 
The main features, as I see them, of Brewster's attitude towards the wave the-
ory and its Newtonian rival are the following. 
(2a) Brewster's Acceptance That the Wave Theory Was Empirically 
More Successful 
Brewster time and again expressed great admiration for the theory and fully 
acknowledged that it had enjoyed unparalleled explanatory and predictive 
success: 
I have long been an admirer of the singular power of this theory to explain 
some of the most perplexing phenomena of optics; and the recent discoveries 
of Professor Airy, Mr Hamilton and Mr Lloyd afford the finest examples of 
its influence in predicting new phenomena. (1833b, 360)3 
Elsewhere (1833a, 318) he talk¢ of the "theory ofundulations, with all its power 
and all its beauty." 
(2b) Brewster's Belief That the Wave Theory, Despite its Empirical 
Success, Could Not Be True 
Despite its empirical success, Brewster quite explicitly held that the wave theory 
was, when considered as a "physical theory," false. He produced two main argu-
ments in this connection. 
The first was of a general methodological kind: namely that the fact that the 
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wave theory explained and predicted a whole range of phenomena did not estab-
lish it as a physical truth. Instead: 
Twenty theories . . . may all enjoy the merit of accounting for a certain class 
of facts provided they have all contrived to interweave some common principle 
to which these facts are actually related. (1833b, 360) 
Brewster admitted that the wave theory's predictive success did indeed mean that: 
it must contain amongst its assumptions (though as a physical theory it may 
still be false) some principle which is inherent in ... the real producing 
cause of the phenomena of light .... (Brewster 1838, 306) 
But he went on to make his own opinion clear that, as a physical theory- as, that 
is, a fully realistically interpreted claim about the universe-the wave theory is 
indeed false. In particular, a full, realistic interpretation committed the wave the-
ory to "an ether, invisible, intangible, imponderable, inseparable from all bodies, 
and extending from our own eye to the remotest verge of the starry heavens" 
(ibid.). This was always too much-or perhaps too little-for Brewster to 
swallow. 
Whether or not Brewster would have subscribed to the strong view-that a the-
ory may be totally empirically adequate and yet still not "physically" true-is not 
clear. It is not clear precisely because his second argument was that the wave the-
ory's explanatory and predictive success, though impressive, was definitely 
limited. Indeed on Brewster's view there were two important areas in which the 
wave theory failed, and failed badly. 
These were dispersion and selective absorption. Since similar methodological 
conclusions are drawn from the two cases, I shall just concentrate on the second 
phenomenon, which Brewster in fact discovered. Brewster found that if sunlight 
is passed through certain gases and then dispersed in a prism, its spectrum is 
marked by a whole series of sharp, dark absorption lines. For example, he noted 
more than a thousand such lines in the spectrum of sunlight that had passed 
through "nitrous acid gas." This implies that such media absorb particular ele-
ments of the solar spectrum (or at any rate very narrow ranges of such elements), 
while transmitting other elements "infinitesimally close" to the absorbed ones. 
This was not a question of the refutation of a particular version of the wave 
theory-instead it marked a difficulty for the whole approach. This was because, 
whatever the details, the general story that the wave theory was forced to tell con-
cerning this phenomenon was, as Brewster emphasized, so farfetched. Let's con-
centrate for sake of illustration on just one dark line in the spectrum of light trans-
mitted through "oxalate of chromium and potash." The wave theory is forced to 
say that the ether within that gas: 
freely undulates to a red ray whose index of refraction, in flint glass, is 1.6272, 
and also to another red ray whose index is 1.6274; while ... its ether will 
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not undulate at all to a red ray of intermediate refrangibility whose index is 
1.6273! (1833b, 362) 
In other words, whatever detailed account may eventually be given, a tiny differ-
ence in the length of a wave must be supposed to produce a black-and-white 
change from free passage through the ether within the gas to no passage at all. 
Brewster pointed out (1833a, 321) that: 
There is no fact analogous to this in the phenomena of sound, and I can form 
no conception of a simple elastic medium so modified by the particles of the 
body which contains it, as to make such an extraordinary selection of the undu-
lations which it stops or transmits. . . . 
He quite reasonably concluded that the phenomenon "presents a formidable 
difficulty to the undulatory theory." As we shall see, he also felt that this was an 
area where the emission theory scored over the wave theory, since it was easy 
to produce at any rate outline suggestions for how selective absorption might be 
accommodated within the emission approach. 
(2c) Brewster's Disagreement with the Wave Theorists Over the Way 
Forward 
So far as the friends of the wave theory were concerned, Brewster's claims, 
considered simply as claims about the present version of the wave theory, were 
perfectly reasonable and indeed completely uncontroversial. Both Airy and 
Baden Powell, each of whom responded directly to Brewster, freely ac-
knowledged that the wave theory as it stood had no adequate explanation either 
for dispersion or for selective absorption. Airy and Powell both insisted that the 
main question, and their main disagreement with Brewster, was about the ap-
propriate response to those admitted difficulties. In other words, the main dis-
agreement .was heuristic. 
Brewster does seem to have believed that, despite all the difficulties that had 
mounted against it, there was life left in the Newtonian emissionist theory. He 
echoed Herschel's sentiment expressed some ten years earlier that, were sufficient 
talent and energy invested in the emission theory, it might yet turn the tables of 
scientific superiority on its undulatory rival. Correspondingly, Brewster felt that 
the near monopoly of theoretical talent that the wave theory had attracted by the 
1830s was unhealthy. He believed that the experimental difficulties he had 
pointed to were sufficient to justify a less committed, more theory-neutral ap-
proach than the one that then dominated optics in both Britain and France. 
Airy and Powell both argued that, on the contrary, the only reasonable re-
sponse to the empirical difficulties that beset the wave theory was renewed com-
mitment to it, aimed at solving those difficulties within the general approach. 
They each argued as follows. First, the wave theory was already overwhelmingly 
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superior in terms of empirical support. Airy and Powell both accepted that there 
were phenomena (including those that Brewster had highlighted) that the wave 
theory could not (or could not yet) explain. However they insisted that there were 
lots of phenomena that the wave theory explained and/or predicted, but that the 
emission theory could not deal with adequately at all; and that there was no 
phenomenon that the Newtonian theory could adequately explain (let alone pre-
dict) that the wave theory could not. 4 
Secondly, while the corpuscular theory had run into difficulty after difficulty 
and failed successfully to overturn any of them, the wave approach had, on the 
contrary, already demonstrated the capacity to be modified in the light of ex-
perimental difficulties in a scientifically fruitful way. Airy in particular stressed 
the example of Fresnel's switch from longitudinal to transverse waves. 
What had happened in that case was, in outline, roughly as follows. Wave the-
orists before Fresnel had all assumed that the ether is an extremely rare and subtle 
fluid- how else could the planets move so freely through it? It is a theorem of 
mechanics that fluids transmit only longitudinal (pressure) waves. (Longitudinal 
waves are ones in which the particles of the medium oscillate in the same direction 
as the overall transmission of the wave through the medium; an example being 
a sound wave in air.) Fresnel's own initial theory was indeed that light is a longitu-
dinal wave. However, he and Arago then established experimentally that if, say, 
the two beams emerging from the two slits in the double-slit experiment are polar-
ized at right angles to one another (by passage through suitably oriented crystal 
plates), then the interference fringes disappear. It seemed that light beams polar-
ized in mutually orthogonal planes fail to interfere (or, rather, fail to produce in-
terference fringes). Neither Fresnel nor any other wave theorist had, at this stage, 
any theory of the polarization of light. But, so long as the light waves were as-
sumed longitudinal, the precise account of what happened when light is polarized 
could make no difference. Assuming that the wave theory is at all correct, the 
longitudinal assumption alone means that the disturbances in the two coherent and 
near-parallel beams (the slits are, remember, very close together) must them-
selves be near parallel and hence must alternately interfere constructively and 
destructively for different path differences. The Fresnel-Arago experiment, 
therefore, put the wave theory into deep trouble. Fresnel took a still deeper breath 
and switched to the transverse wave theory: to the theory that the ether particles 
oscillate at right angles to the direction of the propagation of light. This yields 
an easy theoretical account of the process of polarization: the disturbance in an 
unpolarized beam has components in all planes through the direction of propaga-
tion; polarization (linear or plane polarization, that is) consists in restricting the 
disturbance to one such plane. This explained the apparent "sidedness" of polar-
ized beams, and also explained the Fresnel-Arago results. The oscillations in 
beams that are polarized orthogonally are assumed themselves to be orthogonal. 
Hence, although the two sets of oscillations certainly interfere or superpose-to 
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produce (in general) elliptically polarised light-they operate at right angles 
rather than along the same line, and hence can never destructively interfere so as 
to produce fringes. Although it straightforwardly dealt with this difficulty over 
polarized light, the switch to the transverse theory certainly required a deep 
breath. This was because elastic media can transmit such waves only if they ex-
hibit resistance to sheer, that is, only if they are solids. But how could the planets 
move completely freely through an elastic solid ether?5 
But whatever the conceptual difficulties, Fresnel's new transverse theory 
scored stunning empirical successes. Not least when Hamilton showed in 1830 
that the transverse theory entails the hitherto unsuspected phenomena of internal 
and external conical refraction-predictions that were confirmed by Lloyd in 
1833. Airy's point about this theoretical shift was that the phenomena of polarized 
light discovered by Fresnel and Arago were major difficulties for the original ver-
sion of the wave theory, no less major than the difficulties now cited by Brewster 
against the new version of the theory. But, in the earlier case, rather than give 
up the whole theory, Fresnel had modified it and had in this way produced a the-
ory whose empirical virtues Brewster himself now rightly applauded. On the 
other hand, Airy told Brewster: 
Had Fresnel proceeded as you (apparently) would wish us to proceed, the un-
dulatory theory would not now have existed. (1833, 423) 
And so the major predictive success would have been missed. 
The wave theory had already shown the ability to turn major difficulties into 
major successes. Its only well-articulated rival seemed hopeless: the emission 
theory had simply stumbled from one difficulty to the next, without producing 
anything remotely resembling the predictive success of the wave theory. Airy and 
Powell both acknowledged that important empirical problems did face the wave 
theory in the 1830s, but given the overall methodological situation, the only 
reasonable reaction to these problems seemed to be to work on the wave theory 
in the attempt to eliminate them. As Baden Powell put it: 
no sound philosopher would for a moment think of abandoning so hopeful a 
track, and none but the most ignorant or perverse would find in the obstacles 
which beset the wave theory anything but the most powerful stimulus to pursue 
it. (Powell 1841, iii) 
3. Did Brewster Blunder? 
So, these are the main elements of Brewster's view of the wave-particle rivalry 
in optics in the 1830s, compared to the views of the contemporary proponents of 
the wave theory. Was Brewster's position "irrational"? The question, along in-
deed with the whole issue of the rationality of theory change in science, stands 
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in desperate need of clarification. In this section I shall try to bring the general 
issue into focus through an analysis of Kuhn's influential views on theory change. 
This analysis will, in turn, sharpen the questions that need to be asked about 
Brewster's particular views. 
(3a) Reason and Theory Choice 
Kuhn's account of paradigm change in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
and in particular his claim that resistance of the new paradigm is never irrational, 
led critics to accuse him of holding that the decision to adopt a new paradigm is 
never "based on good reasons of any kind, factual or otherwise,"6 and hence of 
making fundamental theoretical changes in science "a matter for mob psychol-
ogy. "7 Kuhn has directly confronted such criticisms in his article "Objectivity, 
Value Judgement and Theory Choice. "8 He explains that he has never denied that 
"reason," in the form of the "objective factors" from the philosopher of science's 
"traditional list" (including such factors as empirical accuracy and scope, con-
sistency, simplicity, and fruitfulness) plays a crucially important role in theory 
change: 
I agree entirely with the traditional view that [these objective factors] play a 
vital role when scientists must choose between an established theory and an 
upstart competitor . . . [T]hey provide the shared basis for theory choice. 
(322) 
However, these objective factors supply no "algorithm for theory choice." At 
any rate when the choice is still a live one in science, they never dictate the choice 
of one of the rival theories. This is for two main reasons. First, single factors of-
ten turn out to be ambiguous when applied to the theories as they stood at the time 
when the choice was being made. It is often assumed, for example, that the Coper-
nican heliocentric theory was empirically more accurate (that is, had a better 
detailed fit with the empirical data) than the Ptolemaic theory. This eventually be-
came true, but only as a result of the work of Galileo, Kepler and others-who 
had clearly then already "chosen" the Copernican view for different reasons (if 
for any reasons at all). Secondly, even if the single factors in the list of objective 
virtues each point in a definite direction, it is by no means always the same direc-
tion. Again taking the Copernican revolution as example, and again taking the 
rival theories as they then stood (say in 1543), while simplicity (in a certain spe-
cial sense) favored the Copernican theory, consistency (with other accepted the-
ories) unambiguously favored the Ptolemaic theory. 
It follows, therefore, claims Kuhn, that the objective factors must always be 
supplemented by "subjective" (or, rather, individual or idiosyncratic) factors in 
order to deliver an unambiguous preference: 
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My point is, then, that every individual choice between competing theories de-
pends on a mixture of objective and subjective factors, or of shared and in-
dividual criteria. (325) 
This account of theory choice, according to Kuhn, diverges comparativel:r' 
little from that "currently received" in the philosophy of science (321). He ac-
cepts, on his part, that the "traditional" objective factors play a vital role. While 
the philosophers have, on their part, abandoned the idea of an entirely objective 
algorithm for theory choice, or, at any rate, have relegated it to a practically unat-
tainable ideal, they have further accepted that, as a matter of fact, subjective (or 
idiosyncratic) factors have played a role in the choices actually made by scien-
tists. The gibes about "mob pyschology," therefore, "manifest total misunder-
standing" (321): properly understood, he and the philosophers of science are in 
broad agreement. In particular, he does not deny (and never has denied) that those 
who switch to a new paradigm in a scientific revolution have good reasons for 
doing so. The only thing is that those who stick with the old paradigm do so for 
"good reasons" too: "there are always at least some good reasons for each possible 
choice" (328). 
Is this rather cozy view of no real conflict correct? One major problem is that 
current philosophy of science is altogether less monolithic than Kuhn seems to 
assume (philosophy of science is ''pre-paradigmatic"). There is no single received 
view in philosophy of science on theory change. At least two broad traditions 
need to be differentiated. One-the subjectivist tradition-is represented by 
personalist-Bayesianism. According to this view a person is rational ifhe assigns 
degrees of belief to the theories available to him in such a way that these degrees 
of belief obey the probability calculus and the principle of conditionalization. 9 
The latter requires that the rational agent's posterior degree of belief in a theory 
T, that is, his degree of belief in view of the actual evidence e that has accumu-
lated at some later stage, should be measured by the conditional probability 
p(T ,e). The value of this latter quantity is, of course, dependent on the prior prob-
ability that the agent assigns to T, that is, roughly speaking, his degree of belief 
in T ahead of any (new) empirical evidence. On the personalist view, this prior 
probability is a purely subjective matter. This means that there is indeed no real 
clash between this view and Kuhn's account as just presented. It is in fact easy 
to give a personalist-Bayesian reconstruction of the theory choices of pretty well 
any scientist by making suitable assumptions about his distribution of priors. Did 
Fresnel switch to the wave theory while Brewster resisted it and stuck with the 
corpuscular theory? Well then, Brewster clearly gave the wave theory a very low 
prior probability-a much lower one than did Fresnel. Did Einstein resist the 
quantum theory while acknowledging the strength of the evidence in its favor at 
a time when Bohr was already fully persuaded of the theory by the same evi-
dence? Well then, Bohr clearly assigned a higher prior probability to the quantum 
328 John Worrall 
theory than did Einstein. The personalist-Bayesian can show that in the limit, as 
evidence accumulates, the degrees of belief of all rational scientists in certain cir-
cumstances converge on the same values, irrespective of their personal prior 
probabilities. But of course in real situations we are never at the limit, and resis-
tance by a scientist to any theory in any evidential situation can be explained as 
rational by ascribing to him a sufficiently low prior degree of belief in the theory. 
It is, however, precisely this aspect ofpersonalist-Bayesianism that is found 
objectionable by the defenders of a second major tradition in philosophy of 
science. The objectivists, as they might be called, see personalist-Bayesians as 
in effect abandoning the whole idea that scientific change is a rational affair. 10 On 
the objectivist view, some scientific judgments about the relative merits of com-
peting theories are dictated by objective factors (although not necessarily those 
on Kuhn's list). On this view, if some particular scientist, because of subjective 
or idiosyncratic considerations, fails to concur in such a judgment, then the scien-
tist does indeed ''violate scientific standards." Those who criticized Kuhn for mak-
ing scientific change an irrational affair clearly belong to this second tradition: 
and it is by no means clear that Kuhn's subsequent clarification of his views does 
anything to reduce the gulf between him and them and hence to lead to a with-
drawal of the mob psychology charge. There are two main reasons for this lack 
of clarity. The first is a misunderstanding on Kuhn's part about the objectivist 
claim that scientific change is a rational matter; and the second is great confusion 
on the part of the objectivists over which exact scientific judgments about the rela-
tive merits of rival scientific theories are dictated by "reason." 
First, Kuhn (and some Kuhnians) often writes as if it were a surprise that hold-
outs like Priestley or Brewster produced arguments for their position and as if 
this on its own refuted the view that reason has dictated certain theoretical 
changes in science. But no defender of the objectivist approach, I take it, claims 
(or has ever claimed) that those who hold out for the older paradigm in what turns 
out to be a revolution will resort to simple dog-in-the-manger "Yah, boo, hiss!" 
tactics. Of course these holdouts will argue for their position-that is, give, in 
the straightforward sense, reasons for it. No one even denies, I take it, that some 
of these could be considered prima facie good reasons - in the sense that they can-
not simply be dismissed without investigation as appeals to emotion rather than 
reason. Creationists, after all, have produced long books arguing their case; Je-
hovah's Witnesses will happily engage you for hours in arguments that purport 
to show that Nature has a design that bespeaks God's hand. Arguing against crea-
tionists, say, is, indeed, less easy than some other people think (as is shown by 
the hash that is sometimes made of it). 11 The objectivist-rationalist, however, 
claims that it may nonetheless turn out that the creationist's case disintegrates (or 
is shown to be extraordinarily weak) on careful analysis. This would mean that 
such a creationist could be judged ''unscientific" or "irrational." But if this latter 
epithet is applied, then it should be understood as meaning that the person is not 
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persuaded by scientifically cogent reasons, not that she has no reasons at all for 
holding the views she does. Of course, she will have such reasons-at least her 
prior belief in God and the 'literal truth' of the Bible; but also perhaps 'scientific 
evidence' that she holds to be strong and that may require a good deal of analysis 
before being revealed as bogus, or simply as oflittle weight when compared with 
the evidence in favor of rival views. (As I shall discuss in more detail later, Kuhn 
also writes as if his "rationalist" opponents were committed to the view that all 
the evidence standardly points in favor of the new theory in a scientific revolution; 
but it is surely clear that his opponents need only claim that on balance the evi-
dence objectively favored the new theory.) 
I said there are two obstacles in the way of clarifying the exact disagreement 
between Kuhn and those in the objectivist philosophical tradition. The second is 
that the upholders of this tradition have either not been clear, or have been in clear 
disagreement, about exactly which judgments they see as sometimes dictated by 
objective rational considerations. 
In Brewster's-case, as we saw, his "choice" of theory was not a simple matter: 
he expressed several quite different views about different aspects of the wave-
particle rivalry, different views that might merit different responses concerning 
their rationality. In general, there are at least three judgments that a scientist 
might make about a particular theory and that ought to be distinguished. First, 
the judgment that that theory is presently best favored by the known evidence; 
second, the judgment that the theory is true, or, perhaps, "approximately" or "es-
sentially" true; and third, the judgment that it is the best theory to work on, in 
that the general ideas underlying it provide the best opportunities for further 
scientific advance. 
There are, of course, important connections between the three judgments. In-
deed, if the development of science were "essentially" cumulative, at all levels-
theoretical as well as empirical-there would hardly be any urgency in separating 
the three judgments. Suppose that-as "older" philosophers of science are usually 
accused of holding-new theories in science always included older theories 
(where "inclusion" is allowed to mean "inclusion with minor modifications"). 
Even in that case, there would, of course, be no question of our theories being 
demonstrated by the empirical evidence. But at least there would be nothing in 
the history of science that told against the view that in accepting a theory, a scien-
tist accepts it as true (or essentially true). Similarly since we should then presuma-
bly make the inductive assumption that essential accumulation would continue to 
hold in the case of.future changes in science, it would seem to follow that the only 
rational choice of theory to try to develop further would be the presently accepted 
theory. This is because any theory that was accepted in the future would be (in-
ductively) guaranteed to be an extension (or "essential extension") of that theory 
presently accepted. 
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No knockdown refutation can be expected of this essential accumulation view 
of scientific development: because of the vagueness introduced by the modifier 
"essential." Nonetheless comparison with anything like an accurate history of 
science makes the view extremely implausible. Consider for example the history 
of optics. Even if this history is run only from the late seventeenth-century on-
wards, it contains a succession of quite different theoretical ideas. The idea that 
light consists of material particles was widely held in the eighteenth-century, until 
it was superseded, following Fresnel's work, by the idea that light consists of peri-
odic disturbances transmitted through an all-pervading elastic medium. Particles 
in a void and waves in a medium certainly look as close to "chalk and cheese" 
as do chalk and cheese themselves. The wave theory was in turn superseded by 
Maxwell's theory of light as a disturbance transmitted through a disembodied 
electromagnetic field. Maxwell himself, of course, was convinced that a mechan-
ical ether underlay the field, but a whole series of attempts to produce a mechani-
cal model failed and left the field as an irreducible, or at any rate unreduced, 
primitive-meaning that here too there was radical discontinuity at the theoretical 
level: it is again hard to think of two things more different than an elastic distur-
bance and an electric (displacement) current. Finally, as part of the quantum 
revolution, the theory of the constitution of light was again fundamentally 
altered-according to this theory, light consists of photons obeying a new, en-
tirely nonclassical mechanics. 
Of course (and despite what Kuhn and Feyerabend at one time seemed to be 
claiming) there has been "essential accumulation" at the empirical level. Succes-
sive theories, despite being separated by "revolutions," dealt with an ever wider 
range of phenomena. The material particle theory could at best deal adequately 
only with simple reflection and refraction; Fresnel's wave theory added interfer-
ence, diffraction, and polarization; Maxwell added various phenomena con-
cerned with the interaction between light and electricity and magnetism; the pho-
ton theory added the photoelectric effect and many others. In this process no 
empirical explanatory power was lost, except perhaps momentarily, even though 
the explanations were radically altered. 12 
In this optical case (as I believe in most cases), more of the older theory enters 
the new than simply its empirical success: the mathematical equations, and hence, 
if you like, the structure, of the older theory are preserved as well (perhaps as 
limiting cases). An especially clear instance is provided by the transition from 
Fresnel to Maxwell. Fresnel's equations, which yield the relative intensities of 
reflected and refracted light beams in various circumstances, are preserved en-
tirely intact within Maxwell's more general theory. However, this continuity is 
purely structural or syntactic. The equations remain the same, but the interpreta-
tion of the fundamental theoretical term involved in them changes completely. Of 
course, a theory-neutral term, like "optical disturbance," can easily be introduced 
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to do service for both theories; but this should not be allowed to obscure the fact 
that the optical disturbance in Fresnel's theory represents the distance a particle 
of the ether has been moved from its equilibrium point, while in Maxwell it is 
a disturbance in a disembodied, nonmechanical electromagnetic field. 
The picture, then, seems clearly to be one of theoretical discontinuity coupled 
with "essential" empirical (and indeed structural) continuity. 13 The need to distin-
guish the three judgments about scientific theories mentioned above becomes ap-
parent. Acceptance of a theory as presently most favored by the evidence need 
not involve accepting that theory as true, or even "approximately true." It may 
empirically be the case that many scientists do believe in the truth (or approximate 
truth) of the latest scientific theories. And, of course, they may be correct: it is 
logically possible that, after a series of"failures" (glorious failures), science has 
now hit on the truth. But those scientists who are more historically aware are 
surely more likely to be persuaded by the so-called pessimistic induction that even 
our best current basic theories will one day be replaced by quite different ones. 
Similarly in the case of heuristic advice, the claim that the only rational course 
is to try to develop that theory that is presently best favored by the evidence de-
pends crucially on the assumption that science is (and will continue to be) cu-
mulative. 
Kuhn never explicitly defines his term ''theory choice." On his construal it does 
however seem to involve taking the theory fully to one's breast, believing it and 
working on it to the exclusion of all others. He takes it that at any rate the original 
aim of the philosophy of science was to construct an algorithm for theory choice. 
And this seems to imply that the original view in philosophy was that the rational 
scientist must always choose, that is, believe and seek to develop, that theory that 
is already most favored by the evidence. 
It is true that many philosophers of science-both subjectivist and 
objectivist-have talked in terms of rational degrees of belief in a theory, and that 
it is difficult to see what this can mean except for belief that the theory is true. 
However, there certainly is also a long-established anti-realist (or better: struc-
tural realist) tradition in philosophy of science (represented by Duhem and Poin-
care, as well as more recent writers) and a fallibilist, or conjectural realist tradi-
tion (represented by Popper, Lakatos, and others). Duhem, Poincare, Popper, 
Lakatos, and many others have all explicitly insisted that one can "rationally ac-
cept" a theory without believing it to be true. Moreover, so far as the heuristic 
question goes, those who think they can identify an orthodoxy or "received view" 
in twentieth-century philosophy of science all agree that an integral part of that 
orthodoxy was the distinction between justification and discovery, and the insis-
tence that philosophy or logic of science was concerned only with the former. 
This would imply, of course, that theory appraisals have no heuristic conse-
quences whatever. There are certainly some more recent philosophers (such as 
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Lakatos) who have held that an assessment of the heuristic power of a theory (or 
paradigm or research program) is an important part of the appraisal of its present 
merits. But Lakatos was careful to insist that there still can be no direct inference 
from "theory T is currently most favored by the evidence" to ''the only rational 
course of action is to try to develop T" (or, "it would be irrational to try to develop 
any rival theory T*''). No sophisticated analysis is needed to see the complete un-
tenability of any position that was committed to any such straightforward infer-
ence. Such a position would entail that the great geniuses of science acted irration-
ally: the wave theory of light, for example was certainly not unambiguously the 
best available theory when Fresnel started to work on it in the early nineteenth-
century; it was Fresnel's work that turned it into overwhelmingly the best avail-
able theory. 
As I see it, then, the objectivist philosophical tradition was never committed 
(or, at any rate, ought never to have been committed) to the view that the only 
rational course of action for a scientist was to "choose" (in Kuhn's sense) that the-
ory that is presently objectively most favored by the evidence. The tradition is, 
I shall take it, committed to the view that there is always an objective ordering 
of the available theories. There is no reason why this should always be a strict 
ordering, but the objectivist is, I think, also committed to the view that what 
generally happens in scientific revolutions is that the previously entrenched the-
ory is deposed by one that is strictly superior to it. 
Over and above these two core views there has been little agreement between 
different proponents of the objectivist tradition. They standardly agree on the 
preference ordering of a given set of rival theories at a given stage of their de-
velopments, but often disagree about the general principles that underlie such or-
derings. More importantly for present purposes, they often disagree about what 
exactly these orderings of theories require from the rational theorist (beyond, of 
course, acceptance of the ordering itself). Against this background, Kuhn's argu-
ments purporting to show that there is no "objective algorithm for theory choice" 
need carefully to be separated into two different groups. Those in the first concern 
the ranking of theories in terms of their objective merits and, in particular, claim 
to show that the new upstart theory in some scientific revolution was not objec-
tively superior to its previously entrenched rival. The arguments in the second 
group point to difficulties in connecting objective rankings of theories with ratio-
nal action and rational belief on the part of theorists. The two sets of arguments 
have very different statuses. Those in the first set would, if successful, knock out 
the core objectivist thesis. But those in the second set can only, I think, serve to 
clarify the open question of what exactly it is rational or irrational to do, given 
that one accepts that the scientific evidence currently favors a particular theory 
over all known rivals. (Since Kuhn himself does not make this distinction, I shall 
need to take the liberty in what follows of recasting his arguments slightly.) 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 333 
3(b) Kuhn, Theory Appraisal, and the Objective Superiority of the 
Wave Theory Circa 1830 
The objectivist holds that there is always an objective ranking of rival theories, 
basically in terms of the evidence in their favor. He also holds that, at any rate 
generally, a "scientific revolution" consists of the replacement of one theory by 
one objectively strictly superior to it. Two main arguments can be found in Kuhn's 
work that, if successful, would tell directly against these theses. 
One, remember, is this. Kuhn gives a whole list of criteria, which he is ready 
to concede are "objective" or, rather, shared by all scientists. The list includes 
empirical accuracy (that is, detailed fit with the data), empirical scope, con-
sistency (both internal and with other accepted theories), simplicity, and fruitful-
ness. One reason why these criteria do not supply a choice algorithm is that in 
live cases of theory choice, and, in particular, during scientific revolutions, these 
diff~rent criteria seldom, if ever, tell in the same direction. Much later, once the 
revolutionary theory has been developed and improved, it may outscore its older 
rival on all counts-but this happens as a result of the revolution and therefore 
can't form its rationale. For example, as I already indicated, Kuhn points out that, 
if the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories are compared, not as they stood after 
the work of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, but at, say, the time when Kepler and 
Galileo were actually choosing to work on the Copernican theory, then the two 
factors of consistency and simplicity (or harmony) told in opposite directions. 
The Copernican theory, in its basic form, undoubtedly gave simpler explanations 
of, for example, the planetary stations and retrogressions and the limited elonga-
tion of Mercury and of Venus. But, the Copernican theory clashed wildly with 
the prevailing, Aristotelian physics and cosmology, while the Ptolemaic theory 
was, of course, an integral part of the Aristotelian worldview. 
Although Kuhn clearly does not establish it in every case of fundamental the-
ory change, his historical claim seems to me likely to be correct. Turning back 
to my own example, if the wave and emission theories of light are compared as 
they stood in 1830, then a case can certainly be made out that, whatever the other 
merits of the wave theory, the emission theory still outscored it in terms of mathe-
matical manipulability. (Classical particle mechanics had long been fully articu-
lated mathematically, while continuum mechanics remained partially 
undeveloped-despite having recently made major advances, often in tandem 
with wave optics.) 
Assume, for the sake of argument, that Kuhn's historical claim is indeed cor-
rect in general. His argument against the objectivist nonetheless goes through 
only if we accept the initial assumption that the objectivist can do no better than 
supply a "laundry list" of objective factors, and is therefore left entirely without 
recourse when two factors from the list pull in opposite directions. 14 But I know 
of no objectivist who would accept Kuhn's list as it stands and none who would 
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be happy to leave any such list unstructured. For example, for Duhem, Poincare, 
Lakatos, and many others, there is a basic criterion: that of predictive empirical 
success. When this criterion is properly understood, it informs most of those on 
Kuhn's list. The basic idea behind this proper understanding is that a theory 
achieves predictive success by yielding an empirical fact without any prior tinker-
ing specifically aimed at making the theory yield that fact. 15 So, stations and 
retrogressions, for example, "fall out" of the basic Copernican heliocentric idea, 
but have to be deliberately built into the Ptolemaic geocentric theory by suitable 
choice of auxiliary assumptions. Thus prediction properly understood need not 
involve a hitherto unknown fact-Copernican theory predicted the already well-
known phenomena of stations and retrogressions. 16 
"Simplicity" and ''unity" -in the scientifically most important senses of these 
terms-are closely related to predictive success. There are surely no clear-cut in-
tuitions about when one basic theory in science is simpler than a rival. Is, for ex-
ample, the idea that light consists of material particles more or less simple than 
the idea that it consists of waves in a medium? I don't see how even to begin an-
swering the question. Where we do have clear intuitions is in cases where a basic 
theory has been so hedged around with qualifications and split into so many un-
related subcases that it clearly becomes too complex, not sufficiently simple, to 
be scientifically acceptable. But in all such cases the complexity and disunity have 
been introduced under the pressure of initially independent or recalcitrant ex-
perimental results. The basic theory has enjoyed no predictive success: it has ei-
ther turned out to be silent about some phenomenon clearly in its field, or to yield 
an incorrect prediction. Special cases and exceptions have therefore had to be in-
troduced to accommodate the facts - at the cost of increased complexity and 
decreased unity. This is clearly what had happened in the case of Ptolemaic as-
tronomy; it also happened, as we shall see, in the case of the corpuscular theory 
of light. 
"Fruitfulness" too is intimately connected to predictive success. A general the-
oretical approach (a paradigm or research program) shows its fruitfulness by sup-
plying ideas for developing specific theories independently of empirical results. 
Such an approach will be judged barren (as Lakatos put it, the research program's 
"heuristic" will have "run out of steam'') only when all these ideas have been tried 
without predictive success; and hence the approach has been reduced to tagging 
along behind the empirical data, always accommodating it post hoc rather than 
predicting it in advance. 
By the early to mid-1830s, for example, the emission approach to optics had 
very definitely proved barren. The ideas supplied by the general claim that light 
is a Newtonian particle had all been tried in the attempt to produce specific the-
ories that dealt with optical phenomena. Particles were, of course, subject to 
forces; forces could be attractive or repulsive: all the apparent deviations from 
rectilinear propagation - reflection, refraction, interference, and diffraction -
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might be explained by having ordinary "gross" material objects exert forces on 
the light particles. The idea that these are strictly point particles always had to 
be an idealization - the finite dimensions of the real particles might come in use-
ful: it might for example be assumed that the particles have sides or poles and 
revolve with respect to these poles as they move along. Various isolated results 
could be explained (at any rate in outline) on the basis of these assumptions - but, 
when it came to anything like details, the "natural" assumptions about the forces 
and the polar revolutions unambiguously failed and instead the required theoreti-
cal assumptions had always to be "read off" the already given facts. There was 
never any correct prediction of a different phenomenon. Instead each new 
phenomenon required further elaboration of the theoretical assumptions (perhaps 
another complication in the field of force set up by the diffracting or refracting 
body or yet another axis of revolution in the particles). As Humphrey Lloyd put 
it in a famous report on the "Progress and Present State of Physical Optics": 
An unfruitful theory may . . . be fertilized by the addition of new hypothe-
ses. By such subsidiary principles it may be brought up to the level of ex-
perimental science, and appear to meet the accumulating weight of evidence 
furnished by new phenomena. But a theory thus overloaded does not merit the 
name. It is a union of unconnected principles. . . . Its very complexity fur-
nishes a presumption against its truth. . . . The theory of emission, in its 
present state, exhibits all these symptoms of unsoundness, ... (1833, 
p. 296) 
Similarly, by the early years of this century, ether-based classical physics was 
no longer fruitful. Instead of the general idea of an ether that fills space suggesting 
new specific theories, the ether had become an embarrassment-ad hoc explana-
tions having to be provided one after the other for why otherwise expected 
manifestations of the ether failed to show up empirically. 
As for the other "objective factors" on Kuhn's list, the philosophers I have men-
tioned would all, I think, either deny them any role or relegate them to subsidiary 
roles. 
This is particularly true of consistency (that is, consistency with other, already 
accepted theories). It is surely a virtue in a theory, rather than a vice, if it clashes 
with some well-entrenched claim-provided that there is strong evidence for the 
theory in the form of predictive empirical success. The inconsistency of Coperni-
can theory with accepted Aristotelian physics supplied interesting and demanding 
problems for further research. Scientists will, no doubt correctly, downgrade (or 
more usually ignore) new theories that clash with well-established ones-but only 
when there is no independent evidence for the new theory. The fact that various 
current hypotheses concerning the "paranormal" clash with accepted theories is 
currently regarded as an important argument against them, but again only because 
those hypotheses have showed no empirical predictive success. It is predictive 
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success that flips inconsistency with other well-accepted theories over from a vice 
to a virtue. 
Kuhn's demonstration that there are important historical cases in which differ-
ent objective factors pulled in opposite directions need not, then, trouble this sort 
of objectivist. He will happily pronounce Copernicus's theory scientifically 
preferable to Ptolemy's in 1543, while admitting that Copernicus's theory was in-
consistent with other previously accepted theories (and even, as we shall see, 
while admitting that the Ptolemaic still had, to some degree, superior established 
empirical accuracy). And, in my own example, such an objectivist will happily 
pronounce the wave theory of light well ahead in 1830, while acknowledging the 
emission theory's superior mathematical power. This is because the criterion of 
predictive success is dominant for him. And on that score, the wave theory of 
light (as Brewster himself more or less clearly acknowledged, as we saw) was 
simply miles ahead of its rival by 1830. In over 150 years, the emission theory 
had failed to produce anything remotely capable of standing alongside Fresnel's 
success in predicting in minute detail the sizes and separations of diffraction 
fringes, let alone his success with the "white spot" at the center of the shadow of 
a small circular disk, the emergence of circularly polarized light from a Fresnel 
rhomb, internal and external conical refraction, and so the list goes on. 
A second argument is to be found in Kuhn against the idea that the winning 
theory in a scientific revolution is generally objectively superior to the older the-
ory. The first argument was based, as we just saw, on the assumption that each 
objective factor tells unambiguously in favor of one of the rival theories, but then 
went on to claim that different objective factors may tell unambiguously in differ-
ent directions. But Kuhn also argues that this initial assumption itself is often 
false: scientists may reasonably disagree over the way that single objective factors 
point. For example, simplicity told in favor of Copernicus over Ptolemy only 
when understood in a very special sense. In other senses, Copernicus's theory was 
by no means clearly the simpler. Similarly, although it is often assumed that the 
Copernican theory was better than the Ptolemaic in terms of empirical accuracy, 
in fact, as the theories stood in 1543, this criterion delivers no clear preference. 
One major problem here is again Kuhn's nonanalytical, acritical approach to 
admission onto his list of objective virtues. The result-from the point of view 
of the analytic philosopher-is often a confused amalgam of various quite differ-
ent ideas about criteria of scientific merit. It is then no news that such confused 
"criteria" supply no clear-cut judgments. Everyone would, for example, surely 
concede to Kuhn that a whole variety of notions of theoretical simplicity are to 
be found in science and philosophy. The moral seems to be that careful analysis 
is needed to sort out the really important notion or notions. (As I already indi-
cated, on my view the important sense of simplicity is intimately related to predic-
tive success.) 
The case of Kuhn's criterion of empirical accuracy is similar. He describes this 
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as "the most nearly decisive" of all the objective factors. But his notion of empiri-
cal accuracy is an unfortunate amalgam of two criteria that should be kept sepa-
rate: predictive success and overall, detailed fit with all the known, relevant em-
pirical data. 
Kuhn points out that, contrary to widespread belief, the Copernican theory did 
not, as it stood in 1543, exhibit unambiguously better empirical accuracy than the 
Ptolemaic: the former did not account for every detailed empirical datum ac-
counted for by the latter (plus some more)-instead each theory enjoyed empiri-
cal successes not shared by the other. Copernican theory did eventually come to 
dominate the older theory empirically, but only as a result of Kepler's and 
Galileo's decisions to "choose" Copernicanism. Similarly in the case of the chemi-
cal revolution, and again contrary to widespread present-day belief, there were 
empirical phenomena that the phlogiston theory could account for, but for which 
Lavoisier's theory could give no account. This is, in other words, the historical 
phenomenon, or alleged historical phenomenon, of "Kuhn loss." It acts as a fur-
ther important source of reasonable subjectivism for Kuhn: if a scientist happens 
to give special weight to a phenomenon whose theoretical codification is "lost" 
in the switch to the new theory, then that scientist may reasonably resist the 
switch. 
Is Kuhn loss a genuine historical phenomenon? Kuhn's own examples of lost 
content tend to be unconvincing. The example he tends to cite in the case of the 
chemical revolution for instance concerns the (alleged) fact that metals are "more 
similar" to one another than are metallic ores. But this is a curious empirical 
phenomenon-certainly it cannot stand as an observation report on a par with 
such things as ''the needle in apparatus A pointed to near '5' on the scale" or "the 
measured angle of elevation of telescope T at time twas 0' ." Moreover the 
phlogiston theory's alleged explanation of this curious fact is more curious still. 
The "explanation" is that metals are more similar to one another "because," unlike 
the ores, they all contain a common ingredient: phlogiston. This "explanation" re-
lies of course on the implicit assumption that any two things that share a common 
constituent are "more similar" to one another than any two other things which do 
not. This either makes no real sense (apart from the notorious multiple ambiguity 
of"similarity ,"there is also the question of how deep we go in the search for com-
mon ingredients-after all, we now think that everything is "made out of' elemen-
tary particles) or it is arguably false (whatever exactly Kuhn had in mind, it seems 
difficult to argue that, say, a piece of coal is more similar to the Koh-i-noor dia-
mond than, say, oxygen gas is to hydrogen gas). 17 
The loss allegedly involved in the Copernican revolution is also 
unconvincing-though for a different reason of more general significance. Kuhn's 
brilliant analysis of this revolution showed that, while the new Copernican theory 
gave genuine explanations of various important qualitative phenomena (such as 
planetary stations and retrogressions and the limited elongation of Mercury and 
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of Venus), which had only been forced into the Ptolemaic framework post hoc, 
the Ptolemaic theory could give detailed quantitative accounts of phenomena that 
the Copernican theory, as it stood in 1543, could not match. This, however, only 
illustrates the importance of keeping quite distinct the criteria of empirical predic-
tive success and overall empirical content, rather than conflating them into one 
notion of empirical accuracy. 
There is a crucial difference between the success enjoyed by the Copernican 
theory and the, admitted, extradetailed empirical content of the Ptolemaic. 
Namely that the latter, but not the former, can be achieved simply by hard work. 
Ptolemy's theory had, of course, been developed and applied for centuries when 
Copernicus challenged it. In general it is not at all surprising if the entrenched 
theory has detailed acounts of phenomena that the new upstart theory cannot yet 
match. No matter how successfully predictive a new theory might have been, 
there would always be some areas where it needed detailed emendation and elabo-
ration. But this is largely a question of hard work ("normal science"). The 
Ptolemaic system had been developed by letting the already known data guide the 
construction of the required auxiliaries within the general geocentric framework: 
no predictive success having been achieved in the process beyond that secured 
by simple inductive extrapolation. 18 It was surely clear already in 1543 that, just 
as the detailed phenomena had been worked into the Ptolemaic framework by 
suitable elaboration of auxiliary assumptions and mathematical devices, so they 
could, with sufficient effort, be accommodated within a heliocentric (or, rather, 
heliostatic) framework. Given a general theoretical framework, specific theories 
with ever greater empirical content can generally be developed simply through 
hard work. What cannot by definition be achieved in this way is the sort of 
qualitative predictive success that made Kepler and Galileo think that that sort of 
hard work on the Copernican framework was worthwhile. These predictive suc-
cesses occur precisely when the empirical result "falls out" of the general theory 
without any tinkering. The Ptolemaic theory had had no such success. So nothing 
was "lost" in this case that could not clearly be regained. 
Our own optical example might seem to supply a rather more convincing ex-
ample of Kuhn loss. Brewster, as we saw, made a good deal of the fact that the 
wave theory could explain neither dispersion nor selective absorption. But this 
case is not clear-cut either. 
As Airy and Powell insisted in their replies to Brewster, neither of these 
phenomena was properly explained on either theory. Certainly neither was (in my 
sense) predicted by the emission theory- neither fell directly out of that theory 
in the way that diffraction patterns fall out of Fresnel's theory, or that the bending 
of light rays, say, falls directly out of the general theory of relativity. Indeed not 
only was neither phenomenon predicted by the emission theory, no full emis-
sionist account of either dispersion or selective absorption was ever given - even 
post hoc. The most that the emissionist could argue is what Brewster did in fact 
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argue: that it was easier to see how, in general conceptual terms, an explanation 
of the phenomena might be produced within the corpuscular theory, than it was 
to see how such an explanation might be produced within the wave theory. 
Concentrating for simplicity just on the case of selective absorption: the wave 
theory, as Brewster forcefully argued, was bound to have great difficulty in con-
juring this discrete, "black-and-white" phenomenon out of its underlying assump-
tions that were unambiguously assumptions of continuity. An infinitesimal 
change in a continuous parameter- the length of the wave-would somehow have 
to make all the difference between free passage through the ether within a selec-
tive medium and no passage at all. The emission theory, on the other hand, made 
light consist of different particles: if the emission theory made some effect depend 
on the value of some parameter associated with these particles, there was no need 
for it to assume that all possible values of this parameter were instantiated. It 
could always indeed explain any apparent continuity, for example of the "degrees 
of refrangibility" associated with the solar spectrum, as an illusion, deriving from 
the inability of our coarse senses to detect slight but nonetheless existent differ-
ences. No precise emissionist account of selective absorption was in sight in the 
1830s; but such an outline account could readily be seen to be a conceptual possi-
bility. It could, for example, readily be conceived that two different light par-
ticles, while having almost identical degrees of refrangibility, might nonetheless 
differ in some other important respect, which accounted for one of them being 
absorbed by the medium while the other passed through. Brewster's own sugges-
tion was that the phenomenon might be chemical in nature- that the different light 
particles have different chemical constitutions, which might then explain why one 
is absorbed and the other not. Brewster had no more than this to say-hence his 
suggestion was certainly, as it stood, vague and untestable. But even if the wave 
theory had almost nothing to match in this regard, it must be admitted that in 1830 
it could not match it. 
Does this mean that, at any rate for the wave optics revolution, I have conceded 
Kuhn's case and accepted that empirical accuracy did not tell unambiguously in 
favor of the wave theory? Such an inference, clearly encouraged by Kuhn, would 
be an obvious non sequitur. Kuhn's argument again seems to presuppose that 
those philosophers who hold that theory change in science is generally a rational 
affair are committed to the claim that nothing ever tells in favor of the superseded 
theory. In fact, of course, such philosophers have long recognized the need to 
weigh evidence. An "objectivist-rationalist" clearly need not hold that the theory 
superseded in a revolution had no virtues, nor even the view that it had no virtues 
not shared by the superseding theory. It is enough if on balance the superseding 
theory is clearly better. This applies in particular to empirical or evidential 
virtues. 
This simple point allows us to bring together much of the foregoing discussion. 
In the Copernican case, even if the objectivist acknowledged that the accounts it 
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provided of detailed empirical phenomena favored the Ptolemaic theory, he 
would certainly hold that the qualitative predictive successes scored by the Coper-
nican theory favored that theory much more highly. No attempt to explain theory 
change as rational can hope to succeed if it fails to give extra theory-confirming 
weight to predictive success over post hoc accommodation. Indeed since such 
post hoc accommodation can always be achieved at least in principle (this follows 
from Duhem's point that the central framework-supplying theories in science 
have in isolation no empirical consequences), some philosophers give zero 
confirming weight to empirical data that have simply been worked into a theoreti-
cal framework. For such philosophers, a genuine case of Kuhn loss would need 
to involve the loss of some genuinely predicted content: that is, a case in which 
some phenomenon "fell out" of the older theory, but not out of the newer theory. 
To my knowledge no such case has been presented. But even without adopting 
this extreme view, and even if there are genuine cases of Kuhn loss, the objec-
tivist need not be in trouble. Let's accept (as I believe we should) that dispersion 
and selective absorption (weakly) favored the emission theory in the 1830s. Still, 
everyone accepts (including Brewster, as we saw) that by then a long list of 
phenomena that (strongly) favored the wave theory could readily be produced. 
This list includes several phenomena that had been genuinely predicted by the 
wave theory- such as various diffraction patterns, various results about circularly 
and elliptically polarized light, and the phenomena of internal and external coni-
cal refraction. Airy and Powell were right that the only theory to enjoy any 
genuinely predictive success was the wave theory. 
On any account, then, and being as generous to the emission theory as one 
likes, the evidence, on balance, strongly favored the wave theory. Thus the ob-
jectivist could (rather generously) concede that there was a Kuhn loss involved 
in this revolution concerning dispersion and selective absorption, without threat 
to her position. This is because the Kuhn loss involved in not making the switch 
to waves would have been enormous. Philosophers of science have not achieved 
any great measure of agreement over the general principles involved in weighing 
evidence, but everyone surely agrees on the need to weigh. And it is clear that 
no adequate account of weight of evidence could fail to have the balance coming 
down with a mighty bang in favor of the wave theory in the 1830s. 
I claim to have shown so far that nothing in either Brewster or Kuhn tells 
against the view that, by the 1830s, the wave theory was objectively superior to 
its emissionist rival. There remains, then, what I have insisted must be treated 
as a separate question: that of what acceptance of this appraisal requires from the 
"rational scientist." As I suggested, I shall use the example of Brewster in an in-
vestigative way to attempt to illuminate the murky issue of just how strong an im-
plication for rational belief and conduct our theory appraisals ought to have. So: 
did any of Brewster's theoretical views place him beyond the "rational" pale? 
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(3c) Was Brewster Irrational to Hold Out Against the Scientifically 
Superior Wave Theory? 
Let me first clear away a possible misunderstanding of a purely linguistic kind 
over the terms "rational" and "irrational." Brewster was clearly a clever man, who 
dealt in arguments, who accepted all well-tested experimental data, made all the 
usual inductive generalizations of such data, and who did nothing to transgress 
the rules of deductive logic. Moreover, he clearly accepted that, in terms of 
predictive success, the wave theory had greatly outscored the Newtonian theory 
as things stood in 1830. If, despite all this, we end up saying that some of his 
views were "irrational," then this should clearly be understood in a rather special 
sense: one that carries no suggestion that Brewster is to be put on a par with Rus-
sell's famous "lunatic" (who believed that he was a poached egg), nor with anyone 
who, aiming to get down safely to the ground floor, proposes to take the window 
rather than the elevator, claiming that all evidence that this is foolhardy is evi-
dence purely about the past. Without being irrational in any such blatant sense, 
Brewster might still have contravened best scientific practice in his attitudes to-
wards the rival theories available to him. 
It is (presumably) trivial that the objectivist-rationalist would pronounce 
Brewster irrational ("mistaken" would be better) if he denied that the empirical 
evidence currently favored the wave theory over its emissionist rival. But his ac-
knowledgment of the ''unequalled" predictive and explanatory success of the wave 
theory is surely tantamount to accepting this appraisal. The worry is that if-as 
Lakatos, for example, explicitly stated-this acknowledgment is all that is re-
quired from the rational scientist, then our rules of rationality say perilously little. 
Indeed Feyerabend has claimed that if all that Lakatos's methodology requires is 
an admission of the present score between the rival theories, then it is really "anar-
chism in disguise." It is wrong, I think, to underestimate the importance of simply 
keeping the objective score. (Try, for example, to get a creationist to say that he 
accepts that the evidence currently strongly favors the Darwinian theory, but that 
he nonetheless is working on the creationist approach, hoping eventually to re-
verse the evidential tables.) Nonetheless it is difficult not to yearn for a somewhat 
stronger theory of rationality. 
Let's then look at Brewster's views about what follows (or fails to follow) from 
the acceptance that, in terms of empirical success, the wave theory was well ahead 
of its rival by the 1830s. Can any of these views plausibly be categorized as irra-
tional and, if so, on what grounds? 
As I already indicated, three of Brewster's views raise interesting questions in 
this connection. They are: 
(1) Despite all its success in explaining and predicting optical phenomena, the 
wave theory is not true as a fully realistically interpreted "physical theory"; 
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(2) Despite all its problems, the Newtonian theory might yet "stage a come-
back'' and ultimately tum the tables of scientific superiority on its rival. 
(3) Therefore, Airy and Powell's view-that the only reasonable response to 
the difficulties facing the wave theory was to try to solve them within the 
general wave approach-was not correct. 
I consider each of these in tum. 
(3ci) Brewster's Disbelief in the Wave Theory as a Physical Truth 
Brewster argued that the impressive explanatory and predictive success of the 
wave theory does not logically entail its truth as a fully fledged, realistically inter-
preted physical theory. But Brewster went beyond this obviously correct logical 
claim and clearly held that, as a physical theory, the wave theory was actually 
false. Indeed he predicted that "after it has hung around for another hundred 
years," that theory will give way to a completely different physical theory. 
Given that the wave theory was undoubtedly the best-supported theory avail-
able to him, was it irrational of Brewster to believe it to be false? This would seem 
a harsh judgement to make in view of the fact that Brewster's prediction was 
correct- indeed he was overgenerous to the wave theory, which lasted at best an-
other 70 years, rather than another hundred. 
It is true- and importantly true- that many of the mathematical equations sup-
plied by the wave theory still live on in science; and it is true-and importantly 
(if rather obviously) true-that repeatable (and repeated) experiments do not 
change their results, so that all the correct empirical consequences of the wave 
theory are still, of course, correct. Nonetheless, at the theoretical level there has 
been radical, inelirninable change. The ether-at any rate in anything like the 
form understood by Fresnel-has been entirely rejected by present-day science; 
photons traveling through empty space, despite their so-called wavelike charac-
teristics, could hardly be more different than they are from waves in a mechani-
cal, space-filling medium. 
If current scientific theories are correct, then so was Brewster correct in be-
lieving the wave theory to be false. We surely should not then require the rational 
scientist to believe in the truth of the currently best-available theory. What if the 
rationality requirement is watered down so that it requires from the rational scien-
tist only belief in the approximate truth of the current best theory? The notion of 
approximate truth has proved extremely resistant to precise analysis, but it does 
seem reasonably clear intuitively that, however approximate truth is eventually 
analyzed, Brewster's complete rejection of a real ether is inconsistent with an 
ascription to him of belief even in the approximate truth of the wave theory. It 
would, again, however, surely be difficult to find him guilty of irrationality on 
this score. After all he was surely right; no scientific realist will ever, I fear, pro-
duce an acceptable account of approximate truth that would yield the judgment 
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that ifthe photon theory of light is true, then the classical wave theory is approxi-
mately true. "To a large degree empirically adequate"-yes; "to some degree 
structurally accurate" - no doubt; but "approximately true" - no. 
Many scientists do seem to believe the presently best-available theory to be 
not just highly empirically adequate but actually true (or "very nearly" true); and 
the number of believers not surprisingly increases with the continuing empirical 
success of that theory. Certainly there were many scientists in the early nineteenth 
century (Fresnel himself among them) who believed in a real, mechanical ether 
and the full truth of the basic wave theory. On the other hand there have always 
been other scientists- perhaps more aware of the history of science-who find be-
lief in the truth of the latest theory impossible. This may, as perhaps in Brewster's 
case, be motivated by prior metaphysical beliefs, but it may also be motivated, 
as in, say, Poincare's case, by general methodological and historical considera-
tions about scientific theory. Both because the agnostics often turn out eventually 
to be right and because to do otherwise would be to prejudge a live philosophical 
debate, it would surely be wrong to brand them irrational. Whatever consequence 
the judgment that T is the best available theory has about rational belief, it is not 
the consequence that the only rational course is to believe T to be true (or even 
approximately true). 
As I indicated earlier, many of the problems that Kuhn raises about "theory 
choice" and the lack of an "objective algorithm" for it arise from his implicit as-
sumption that in choosing a theory a scientist must take it fully to his bosom and 
believe it to be true. Of course there are always holdouts in this sense. For ex-
ample, anyone who holds a thoroughgoing instrumentalist view of scientific the-
ory will always be such a holdout- no matter how she ranks the specific scientific 
theories available to her. Although instrumentalism certainly tends to be more 
popular at times when even the best scientific theory is in clear difficulties, it is 
not invariably adopted in this defensive way. Interestingly enough, the two main 
British advocates of the wave theory, Airy and Baden Powell, themselves might 
have to be classified as holdouts in this sense: both adopted explicitly uncommit-
ted views of the ether. I quoted Airy above (p. 321) claiming that Fresnel's wave 
theory had the same status as Newton's gravitation theory, both being "certainly 
true." However, later in this passage he asserted: 
This character of certainty I conceive to belong only to what may be called the 
geometrical part of the theory: the hypothesis, namely, that light consists of 
undulations depending on transversal vibrations, and that these travel with cer-
tain velocities in different media. . . . The mechanical part of the theory, as 
the suppositions relative to the constitution of the ether . . . though gener-
ally probable, I conceive to be far from certain. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Baden Powell. Yet both were fully commit-
ted to the wave theory as superior to all known rivals. 
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(3cii) Brewster's Continued Belief That the Emission Theory Might 
Eventually Prove Triumphant 
Brewster seems to have held that the emission theory-if diligently developed 
by scientists of talent-was likely eventually to prove superior to the wave theory 
(or at any rate might eventually do so). In general, on Kuhn's view, the main 
source of the resistance to new paradigms by elderly holdouts is the assurance 
that they feel that "the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that 
nature can be shoved into the box the [older] paradigm provides" (1962 151-2). 
Kuhn insists that this assurance- while it may irritate the revolutionaries - cannot 
be faulted as "illogical" or "unscientific" or "irrational." Is Kuhn right? 
Suppose first that the claim that nature can be "shoved" into the older "box" 
is merely one about logical possibility. Then the claim is of course correct: put 
in more orthodox terms, and following Duhem (1906), the core theory underlying 
the older theoretical system will not be testable in isolation, and so it follows from 
deductive logic that there must be some assumptions that are consistent with that 
core theory and that, together with that core theory, entail any given experimental 
results. More strikingly, in our historical case (as well as others) the outlines of 
how actually to shove most known optical phenomena into the older box had been 
constructed by the 1820s and 1830s. Among such shovable phenomena were ones 
like interference and diffraction, which more superficial, later treatments 
presented as crucial phenomena-predicted by the wave theory, but quite beyond 
the scope of the emission theory. 19 
On this weak interpretation, Kuhn's assurance that the older paradigm can ac-
commodate all the phenomena certainly exists. But, of course, it does not, as 
Kuhn seems to think, automatically make resistance to the new theory rational. 
That would require (at least) a quite different assurance-the assurance that the 
phenomena can be accommodated within the older paradigm in a scientifically ac-
ceptable way. 20 But this much stronger assurance does not follow from Duhem's 
point about untestability in isolation. We know that some sort of account could 
be given of diffraction, for example, within the emission theory-not only be-
cause of logical considerations, but because the outlines of such accounts were 
constructed. But those accounts were uniformly awful-the assumptions that had 
to be made about different masses of the different light particles, their rotations 
about various axes, and about the dependence of the "diffracting force" on the 
phase of rotation and on the distance from the diffracting object were simply "read 
off" the facts. Those assumptions had to be made more and more complex as more 
facts were taken into account. Even the most assiduous of emissionists, like Biot, 
quietly gave up long before all the facts had been accommodated. Deductive logic 
alone certainly does not, of course, guarantee that any nonawful account even 
could be constructed within the emission theory. 
The only assurance really available to the holdout fails to explain his resistance 
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as rational. But it is of course a further question whether or not it can actually 
become irrational to hold that an older theory will eventually provide scienti-
fically acceptable explanations of presently recalcitrant phenomena. Was it irra-
tional, for example, to believe in 1830 that the emission theory could eventually 
adequately explain diffraction? 
As I just indicated, such a belief certainly does not run counter to deductive 
logic. If one is satisfied with deductive rationality, then the answer must be that 
it was not irrational to believe that the emission theory would eventually ade-
quately explain diffraction. Nonetheless there were strong reasons for regarding 
this belief as false. Every explanatory avenue open to the emissionist had been 
tried and had failed to produce a scientifically adequate account of diffraction. It 
had to be logically possible to make sufficiently complicated assumptions about 
the diffracting forces exercised by gross matter on the light particles, about differ-
ences between the particles themselves, and about "fits" undergone by the par-
ticles so as to accommodate all the known facts. But actually putting this into 
effect had proved practically impossible. Moreover, any such theoretical accom-
modation was clearly going to involve extremely implausible general 
assumptions - for example, that the diffracting forces are quite independent of the 
chemical constitution of the gross diffracting object (two straightedges made 
respectively of, say, cardboard and copper, produce the same diffraction pattern). 
It is simply, as I see it, a fact about the emissionist approach in 1830 that it would 
require the incorporation of some radically new idea before diffraction could ever 
be adequately accounted for. To close one's eyes to this fact would surely be no 
less irrational than to close one's eyes when confronted with Galileo's telescope. 
Brewster's optimistic remarks about the corpuscular theory's prospects are not 
specific enough to make it clear whether he did close his eyes to this fact, or 
whether he simply held the much weaker view that working on the general New-
tonian approach might produce just the right radically new idea to revitalize the 
approach. Assume that Brewster's view was only this weaker one. Was it irra-
tional? 
Well, whatever its disadvantages, it again certainly does not contravene 
deductive logic: of course working on the Newtonian approach might have 
produced the required idea, if we are talking merely about logical possibilities. 
However, and quite unlike most heuristic judgments made in science, this view 
expresses no more than a pious hope. A mid-eighteenth-century Newtonian could 
quite plausibly remain unconcerned by diffraction fringes (which had, after all, 
been around since Grimaldi in 1665 and had been extensively investigated by 
Newton himself). The phenomena of reflection and refraction already established 
for him that gross matter was capable of exercising forces on the light corpuscles, 
forces that diverted those particles from their naturally rectilinear paths. It was 
not at all surprising if similar deviations occurred when those corpuscles passed 
close by the edge of a gross object. It was just a matter of investigating the 
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diffracting forces in detail and thus building up a full theory of the phenomenon. 
An eighteenth-century corpuscularian who expressed the view that working on 
his research program was likely to produce an account of diffraction was not, 
then, simply expressing a pious hope-he could indicate in an abstract but 
reasonably precise way the approach to be adopted. But absolutely no success 
was, as a matter of fact, achieved in this way, despite a good deal of effort through 
the eighteenth century. Moreover, a great many fundamental problems accumu-
lated as this effort was made: Quite unlike the refracting force which differed 
from substance to substance (with refractive index), the diffracting force (as-
sumed by most Newtonians to be another manifestation of the same force) seemed 
to be quite independent of the constitution of the diffracting object. The diffracting 
forces had been assumed to switch from attractive to repulsive and back again 
with bewildering rapidity as the distance from the diffracting object increased; 
the effect of the diffracting force had been made to depend in various complicated 
ways on the phase of the light particle's periodic "fits of easy transmission/reflec-
tion" (conjecturally associated with periodic revolutions of the particles). All this 
and still no satisfactory theory was remotely in sight. No reasonably well-
articulated idea existed that had not been tried and found wanting. Thus, as I sug-
gested, by the 1830s Brewster's view was nothing more than an expression of a 
hope that some new idea could be conjured out of the blue, a new idea that fitted 
in with the general Newtonian approach, and that solved the problems with 
diffraction. 
Well, one can always hope; but, there are, so far as I can tell, no historical 
cases in physics in which a theory subsequently recovered scientific credibility 
having earlier been in straits as dire as those the emission theory was in by 1830. 
No doubt there are cases of very general metaphysical ideas that have had a 
checkered history; once incorporated into a program that steadily degenerated, 
they have then much later been revived by incorporation into a different program 
that progressed. Atomism is often cited in this connection. But if we look for 
cases, not at this very general level but at the level of specific Kakatosian research 
programs (or Kuhnian paradigms), then I, at any rate, don't see any in the history 
of mathematical physics. 21 
Assuming for the moment that this is indeed the lesson of history, the question 
arises of whether it should be written into our account of scientific rationality, 
so that that account pronounces it irrational to try to resuscitate a theory that has 
degenerated beyond a certain point. If it is, there will be problems specifying ex-
actly what that certain point is. Moreover, such a rationality principle would have 
nothing even resembling an a priori justification, but would simply rest on an in-
ductive extrapolation from future to past-this time an inductive extrapolation of 
a methodological kind. 
Let me postpone further discussion of this point until after considering 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 347 
Brewster's third controversial view, which is closely related to the one we have 
just been discussing and raises similar methodological issues. 
(3ciii) Brewster and the Wave Theory's "Monopoly" 
As I noted earlier, Brewster held that work on the emission theory was still 
likely to prove fruitful, and accordingly he regarded as ill advised the "monopoly" 
that he believed the wave theory had come to exert. He saw the experimental 
difficulties with dispersion and selective absorption as enough to deny the wave 
theory "our implicit assent" and enough to justify a less committed approach. Airy 
and Powell held that, on the contrary, given the established success of the wave 
theory, "none but the most ignorant or perverse" would do other than commit 
himself still more wholeheartedly to the wave approach in an effort to solve its 
difficulties. Were they rational and Brewster irrational? 
The first point in favor of Airy and Powell was that, so far as dispersion went, 
there already existed within the general wave theoretical approach some hopeful 
lines of attack on the problem. Fresnel's theory, in its initial version, certainly 
entails no dispersion. But this initial version was based on a very simple theory 
of the ether- one that involved the assumption that its parts strictly obey Hooke's 
law of the proportionality of restoring force to displacement. Several general 
ideas were already around about how a somewhat less simple theory involving 
a slightly more complicated expression for the restoring force could be con-
structed that might yield dispersion. Though none of these had yet borne unam-
biguous fruit, equally they had not all unambiguously run into sand. This is again, 
as I see it, just a/act about the wave approach: it already possessed potential ex-
planatory resources with respect to dispersion that had not been exhausted. 
Airy and Powell went on to back this up with an argument that is explicitly 
inductive in nature. Airy in particular pointed out that, not only was the wave the-
ory already far ahead in terms of explanatory and predictive success, but the way 
it had dealt with earlier experimental difficulties (especially those posed by polar-
ized light) had already shown that it had the capacity to be modified and extended 
in a scientifically fruitful way. Moreover, there was only one alternative theoreti-
cal approach - the emissionist one-and it faced many more difficulties and had 
shown no capacity successfully to overcome them. Airy is claiming in my pre-
ferred terminology that, when confronted by the choice between a research pro-
gram that has long been degenerating and a program that has been highly progres-
sive, then the only reasonable course of action is to work on the second. 
Should this principle be incorporated into our theory of scientific rationality? 
First let's be a little clearer about what exactly the principle is. Certainly within 
research programs there will often be alternative strategies available, and it may 
even not be too farfetched to regard the program as specifying rough probabilities 
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for each alternative strategy's paying off. In such a case "let a thousand flowers 
bloom" and "don't put all your research eggs in one basket" will be the watch-
words: even if there is a "most probable" strategy for advance, it will equally 
clearly not be irrational to pursue a different one. Indeed, as has often been 
pointed out, we would like some members of the scientific community to pursue 
high-risk strategies. In such cases-again as has often been pointed out-
rationality applies (at any rate most directly) to decisions taken by a community 
collectively rather than to those of individuals. 22 Even between research pro-
grams, there are cases that are far from clear-cut-at around 1700, say, I would 
not want to say that working on either the wave or the Newtonian approach was 
in any sense irrational. But in just the sort of case we have been discussing- the 
sort of case exemplified by optics around 1830 and in general the sort of case cov-
ered by Kuhn's notion of a scientific revolution - the situation is quite different, 
I believe. So far as I can tell, once a truly progressive program has been devel-
oped in science, the way forward has always been to follow that program, ignor-
ing its degenerating rivals. Kuhn suggests (and has been echoed by others) that 
it may be good for the community for some diehards to remain, since they may 
produce problems for the revolutionaries to solve. This suggestion, as plausible 
as it might sound prima facie doesn't, so far as I can see, wash historically. Cer-
tainly in the optics case, the post-Fresnel diehards were no more than a distrac-
tion. (Brewster did important experimental work, but none of it was informed by 
his emissionist views-even though most of his results were forced into the lan-
guage of a sort of instrumentalized version of the emissionist theory.) 
The general principle, then, that I tentatively propose as a candidate for incor-
poration into the theory of scientific rationality is something like this: When the 
choice is between a highly progressive program and a highly degenerate one, the 
only rational course is to pursue the progressive one until such a time as degenera-
tion sets in there too. 
But, assuming that such a principle were to be incorporated into the theory of 
scientific rationality, what would the grounds for such incorporation be? 
(3d) How Strong Should the Theory of Scientific Rationality Be? 
Brewster in particular and-presumably- Kuhn's holdouts in general cannot 
be faulted on the grounds of consistency with experimental results and deductive 
logic alone. Long before the appearance of The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions, Duhem had fully recognized that those grounds alone leave the theoretical 
scientist with enormous freedom; that is, they produce only a very weak theory 
of scientific rationality. Duhem went on, however, to applaud the "good sense" 
that was enjoyed by the best theoretical scientists and that in effect greatly cur-
tailed this freedom. He was reluctant to incorporate the general principles under-
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 349 
lying this good sense into what he called the "logic of science." Although he was 
not entirely clear about his grounds for this reluctance, they seem to have been 
essentially that the logic of science should somehow be self-justifying, while the 
principles of scientific good sense clearly involve substantive, and therefore 
challengeable, assumptions. Duhem's good sense, indeed, consists basically in 
following the types of procedures that have paid off for science in the past. Hence, 
as I have just tried to explain, if good sense is incorporated into our logic of 
science or general theory of scientific rationality, while it certainly strengthens 
that general theory, it also brings with it certain inductive assumptions. If these 
are challenged-"Why mightn't it happen, just next time, that pursuing a highly 
degenerate program suddenly pays off handsomely?" - it is difficult to see how 
they could be further defended. 
But surely it cannot be a good idea to incorporate pure assumptions into our 
theory of rationality? I think we have to face up to the fact (as perhaps Duhem 
did not) that they are already there. Such assumptions are involved even at the 
level of theory appraisal (Duhem's "logic of science"). No acceptable system of 
appraisal can, for example, do without some principle that downgrades ad hoc 
explanations compared to non-ad hoc ones. For a nineteenth-century Newtonian 
astronomer, for instance, to respond to the difficulties with Mercury's orbit by 
saying "All bodies in the universe are Newtonian except for Mercury and its mo-
tion is described by the following empirical law . . . " cannot be scientifically 
acceptable. But who says that God's blueprint of the universe did not specify that 
there be one exception to every general rule? So far as I can see, we simply as-
sume that this is not true. Similarly, most of us would presumably regard the per-
son who proposes to get down safely to the ground by taking the window as irra-
tional (though thankfully he won't be irrational for long). But long discussions of 
Hume's problem seem to me, at any rate, only to have revealed that even this judg-
ment relies on a pure assumption about the uniformity of nature (even if it is an 
assumption that is genetically "hard wired"). 
To sum up, then: As should always have been clear, deductive logic alone, 
even when coupled with acceptance of low-level ("crude") observation results, 
supplies only a very weak theory of rationality. Making that theory stronger re-
quires committing oneself to substantial assumptions: both general metaphysical 
assumptions and some frankly inductive assumptions based on past scientific suc-
cess. It does seem to be a fact about the history of physics that no one who has 
stuck to a highly degenerating program when a progressive alternative was avail-
able has ever managed to reverse the situation. Hence, those willing to make the 
necessary inductive assumption provide themselves with a theory of rationality 
that says that the only rational course of action in such a situation is to follow and 
develop the progressive program, at any rate for the time being. 
This would mean that when Kuhn claimed that there is no point at which "resis-
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tance becomes illogical, or unscientific" he conflated two claims: one right, one 
wrong. Applying the claim to the particular case of Brewster, there was certainly 
nothing "illogical" about his theoretical views. But this, as I just pointed out, is 
no surprise in view of the (of course crucial) but extremely weak requirements 
imposed by deductive logic alone. Brewster was, however, unscientific or irra-
tional, not in any sense that suggests he was a danger to himself or others, but 
simply in the sense that he did not follow a procedure that seems invariably to 
have paid off in science. His belief in the continued viability of the emission ap-
proach and in the ill-advisedness of the wave theory's monopoly were contrary, 
not to any eternal rules of deductive logic, but to what appears to be best scientific 
practice. On the other hand, his resistance to believing in the full truth of the wave 
theory was not irrational. The history of science provides no inductive grounds 
for believing in the truth of the fully fledged, realistically interpreted versions of 
accepted theories. At any rate in some scientific fields, the truth is rather that, 
on the contrary, history supports the recently much-discussed "pessimistic induc-
tion," which concludes that every fundamental scientific theory, no matter how 
firmly entrenched it might appear for a time, is eventually rejected and replaced 
by another theory inconsistent with it. 
So how, finally, might a "rationally reconstructed" Brewster have viewed the 
wave-particle rivalry? (Using this stronger theory of rationality as the basis for 
reconstruction.) Well, roughly as follows. 
Like my unreconstructed counterpart, I just can't bring myself to believe that 
there is an ether that fills space from my eye "to the remotest verge of the starry 
heavens." Nonetheless, the wave theory oflight seems somehow or other to 
have latched onto part of the structure of the universe. As my real counterpart 
admitted, that theory's striking predictive success surely means that "it must 
contain among its assumptions . . . some principle which is inherent 
in . . . the real producing cause of the phenomena of light. . . . " More-
over, there is a good deal of"heuristic steam" left in the wave approach. It can-
not possibly do any harm to pursue that approach wholeheartedly. I have no 
doubt that the approach will eventually be superseded by a theory based on a 
more believable metaphysics. But the lesson of history seems clearly to be 
that, at any rate structurally, the wave theory, like all predictively successful 
theories, will "live on" within that future theory, perhaps as a limiting case. 
The metaphysics underlying that future theory may well tum out to be closer 
to that underlying the present emission approach. But this approach as it stands 
is played out. And again the lesson of history seems clear: that no amount of 
flogging will revive a horse as dead as this one. 
This rationally reconstructed Brewster would surely have found favor with "com-
mitted" wave theorists like Airy and Powell -who would have recognized his po-
sition as, to all scientific intents and purposes, indistinguishable from their own. 
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Notes 
1. Kuhn (1962, 151). Kuhn elaborates on his conception of the role of the "objective factors" 
in his (1977, especially chap. 13). 
2. The issue is somewhat complicated by the fact that the orthodox eighteenth-century Newtonian 
was much more likely to talk about the ''parts" or "elements" of light than about material light cor-
puscles; and indeed, if pressed, would tend to deny any commitment to the material nature of light. 
Brewster, very much the orthodox Newtonian, did adopt this position and seems to have believed that 
it implied that his view of light was, if not entirely theory free, then certainly theory neutral. Hence 
he sometimes presented himself, not as defending one theory of the nature of light against a rival the-
ory, but rather as defending one scientific method-an empiricist one, which allegedly stuck closely 
to the facts-against a rival scientific method, which not only sanctioned highly theoretical entities, 
in particular the ether, but gave them full scientific honors. This view of his own position (which cer-
tainly derives from Newton himself) is confused: the "parts" oflight, whether or not one abstains from 
a theory of their "ultimate nature," are assumed to retain their own identity as they travel, if un-
disturbed, along their rectilinear paths; if they fail to travel rectilinearly, this is assumed to be due 
to some action that was, in all but name, a force acting on a particle. The whole idea of "parts" of 
light, far from being theory neutral, is directly inconsistent in a number of respects, with the classical 
wave theory. (Although it is true that this was not generally clearly realized even by some of the early 
nineteenth-century defenders of the wave theory.) I have therefore indulged in a (surely permissible) 
"rational reconstruction" and treated Brewster as defending one theory against another (as, logically 
speaking, he surely was). The methodological aspects of the controversy will nonetheless be apparent. 
(For a detailed account of the "parts" of light and the inconsistency of this instrumentalized version 
of the emission theory with the classical wave theory, see my ( 1989).) 
3. Brewster is clearly referring (a) to Airy's modification of the Newton's rings experiment in 
which a metal plate was used as second reflecting surface- Airy showed that, as predicted by the wave 
theory, the central spot was, for certain angles of incidence, light instead of dark; and (b) to Hamil-
ton's prediction of the totally new phenomena of conical refraction on the basis of Fresnel's equation 
for the wave surface within biaxial crystals, a prediction experimentally confirmed by Humphrey 
Lloyd in 1833. 
4. Airy and Powell both insisted that any advantage the emission theory had in regard to disper-
sion and selective absorption was marginal, since nothing like a fully adequate emission account could 
be given of either phenomenon. See also below, pp. 338-39. 
5. This was by no means the only major theoretical problem associated with the switch to the 
elastic solid ether. Another was that a periodic disturbance in an ordinary elastic solid produces a 
wave with both transverse and longitudinal components. The longitudinal component seemed to play 
no role whatsoever in any optical effect. What happened to it? (Much of the history of attempts to 
solve the problems of the elastic solid ether theory is charted in Schaffner (1972).) 
6. Shapere (1966), p. 67. 
7. Lakatos (1970), p. 178. 
8. Kuhn (1977), chap. 13. Unadorned page numbers below in this section refer to this work of 
Kuhn's. 
9. Not all of those who think of themselves as Bayesians accept the principle of conditionalization 
as a constraint on rational belief. However, unless such Bayesians are ready to specify other con-
straints governing changes in belief, then the contrast that I want to emphasize between their position 
and that of the "objectivists" becomes still more marked. 
10. They include some "objective Bayesians" who argue that there have to be rules about which 
prior probability values (or at any rate which ranges of probability values) are "rationally per-
missible." 
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11. Someone who does not make a hash of arguing against the creationists is Philip Kitcher in 
his (1982). 
12. The empirical continuity which, contrary to much presently received opinion, I see in the de-
velopment of science occurs at the level of what Poincare called "crude facts" and Duhem "practical 
facts." Science is undoubtedly not cumulative at the level of "scientific" or "theoretical facts" - but this 
is (a) not surprising and (b) not the major difficulty for a general empiricist view that it is often taken 
to be. (For more details see my [1978] and especially my [1982].) The history of the simple law of 
reflection affords an instructive example. If it is regarded as an empirical fact that light is reflected 
from plane mirrors at an angle equal to the angle of incidence-which, despite its universal character, 
would not, I admit, strain ordinary usage-then the development of Fresnel's wave theory undeniably 
did lead to the rejection of previously accepted "empirical facts." Not only are the laws of geometrical 
optics always strictly wrong according to Fresnel's theory (on that theory there is just no such thing, 
strictly speaking, as a ray in the sense of geometrical optics), but also Fresnel's theory (correctly) 
predicts an observable divergence from the simple reflection law in the case of very narrow mirrors. 
But the actual results here were not the (very useful) idealizations of geometrical optics, but rough 
and ready ray tracings and the like-all of which are yielded equally well by Fresnel's theory. No one 
before Fresnel had experimented with mirrors narrow enough to produce the observable deviation 
from the geometrical law predicted by him. (Indeed prior to this prediction there would have been 
no interest in doing so.) 
13. This picture was already completely clear to Duhem and Poincare. It formed the basis of their 
insistence that the "explanatory" or "metaphysical" part of science (which had proved subject to 
change) is valueless, and that it is only the "representative" part of science that really counts (this 
representative part invariably being carried over into successor theories). For a clarification and de-
fense of Duhem's and (especially) Poincare's "structural realist" (not anti-realist) view of scientific the-
ories, see my (1989). 
14. The structure of Kuhn's argument here does seem implicitly to commit him to this "laundry 
list" view of the objectivists' position. It should be acknowledged, however, that he does on occasion 
nod in the direction of weighting the different criteria; and he is also, as we shall see, sometimes in-
clined to make empirical accuracy the single most important factor. 
15. For further elaboration and references see my (1985). 
16. In his (1957), Kuhn took this as an instance of Copernican theory's greater "harmony"; Lakatos 
and Zahar (1976) show that it is more perspicuously viewed as a genuine prediction (even though of 
an effect that had long been known to occur when Copernicus formulated his theory). 
17. The examples that Paul Feyerabend cites to exemplify "Kuhn loss" are even more curious: 
the "fact" that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind ( a fact "lost" 
in the statistical-kinetic revolution) and even sometimes the "fact" that phlogiston is given off or ab-
sorbed in certain circumstances! The level at which mature science is cumulative is that of Poincare's 
"crude facts" ("the needle pointed to somewhere close to 5 on the scale"). Of course, scientists often 
talk of much higher-level statements as factual or empirical depending on which theories they take 
for granted as parts of "background knowledge." Thus, given certain auxiliary theories the above 
crude fact may be rendered "the current in the wire was 5 amps." This is an example of a "scientific 
fact" for Poincare. Of course if certain very high-level theories are taken for granted, then we can 
get very high-level empirical facts-a description of the individual situation as seen in the light of 
presently accepted theories ("certain free electrons move through the wire so as to create a current 
of a certain strength," or whatever). It hardly needs to be said that, in view of historical changes in 
accepted high-level theories, and even in "background knowledge" auxiliary theories, such facts de-
scribed in these highly theoretical terms may well be "lost" as a result of theory change in science. 
(See my (1978) for further details.) 
18. The predictive success enjoyed by Fresnel's and Copernicus's theories and not, so far as I can 
tell, by the emission theory or by Ptolemy's, concerns the prediction of general types of phenomena: 
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planetary stations and retrogressions, the diffraction pattern for small circular opaque disks, or what-
ever. Almost every theory, of no matter how "cobbled up,'' "degenerate" or ad hoc a kind, will of 
course enjoy "predictive success" of a straightforward inductive, extrapolative kind. Having fixed its 
various epicyclic parameters on the basis of the observation of an orbit (or series of orbits) of the 
planets, the Ptolemaic theory will, of course, go on to predict the future orbits of those planets. 
19. For an account of some of the details of the corpuscular-theoretic accounts of interference and 
diffraction see my (1976). 
20. See my ( 1985) for details. Kuhn's talk of "shoving" phenomena into the older paradigm's "box" 
seems to imply that he is implicitly aware of this point. But, so far as I can tell, he never explicitly 
considers how distinguishing between shoving a phenomenon into a theoretical framework and having 
a phenomenon "fall out" of that framework (and giving more epistemic weight to a theory in the latter 
case) might alter his view of the empirical justification for theory change. 
21. Certaiiily the photon theory does not constitute such a revival of the Newtonian corpuscular 
theory in any significant sense. Photons are of course "something like" material particles-but then 
any two things, no matter how dissimilar, are something like each other in some respects; here the 
dissimilarities are overwhelming. 
22. See, for example, Musgrave (1976) and some very interesting, forthcoming work by Philip 
Kitcher. 
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